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 Since the New Order collapsed in 1998, scholars have tried to characterize the 
“deep architecture” of politics in Indonesia.2 This search for patterns in the 
accumulation and exercise of power has centered around the question of whether 
ancien régime figures continue to dominate politics or whether groups that were 
marginalized during the dictatorship have gained influence. Vedi Hadiz, Richard 
Robison, and Jeffrey Winters, who argue that a small group of wealthy individuals 
rooted in the New Order regime continue to define politics in contemporary 
Indonesia, have made an important contribution to this debate.3 This “oligarchy 
thesis” has been influential for many scholars of Indonesian democracy, yet its focus 
on wealth and material power has led it to neglect the fundamental role of the state 
in Indonesian politics. 
 This chapter challenges the oligarchy thesis, arguing that power continues to 
reside within Indonesia’s state and political institutions in the post-New Order 
period. What is more, the overwhelming majority of figures populating these 
institutions represent “old interests,” as the oligarchy thesis suggests. Yet, rather 
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than being “oligarchs,” these figures are better described as “state elites.”4 Elite 
theory has shown that some elites are indeed defined by their relationship to the 
means of production. Others, however, have become elites as a result of their access 
to other power resources, such as official positions in the government.5 In the 
Indonesian case, many figures consequential in politics, especially at the subnational 
level, are political elites rather than oligarchs. In other words, these figures resemble a 
Millsian “power elite” that derives strength from the commanding positions they 
hold within institutions rather than from material wealth.6 
 Drawing on insights from elite theory,7 I argue that changing relations among the 
elites that dominate the state apparatus have subsequently altered state–society relations 
in contemporary Indonesia. Recruitment, promotion, and retirement mechanisms for 
state elites during the New Order were all oriented towards the central government 
and therefore ultimately regulated by President Suharto.8 By controlling competition 
from within the regime (horizontal competition), as well as suppressing discontent 
and challenges from below (vertical competition), the New Order regime created and 
maintained a certain unity among state elites.9 With their political survival at stake 
after the collapse of the dictatorship in 1998, state elites hastily adopted various 
institutional changes, such as the introduction of free elections, the decentralization 
of power, and reforms of the party system. These changes created competition among 
state elites. To find allies in their battles with one another, they subsequently started 
to “reach out” and “reach down” in the political arena.10 As a result, state elites have 
become much more dependent upon “society” than during the New Order.11 At the 
same time, state elites continue to mediate the influence of societal groups and 
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interests as a consequence of their dominant position within the state and political 
institutions. I argue that the new dynamics among state elites have made them 
receptive to the demands of societal groups, but only if these groups provide 
resources that help those elites gain and maintain power in Indonesian politics. 
Resources that elites value include access to power brokers who can mobilize the 
electorate, the accumulation of financial means to pay for their political battles, and 
coercive power.  
 In order to illustrate this argument, I analyze the adoption of Islamic law (shari’a) 
in South Sulawesi since 1998. I operationalize “political influence” as influence over 
policymaking at the local level for two reasons. First, local politics are the “first 
frontier” for studying the concentration and dispersion of state power because the 
exchange between the state and society is more direct in this stratum than at the 
national level.12 Hence, a focus on local politics can identify at an early stage the 
mechanisms through which boundaries between the state and society are created, 
sustained, and restructured. Second, some societal groups try to change the broad 
legal or institutional structures of a polity, such as the scope of participatory rights or 
the rules for party formation. However, societal groups are usually more effective at 
influencing politics at an intermediate level, namely by shaping public policy.13  
 I focus on shari’a policymaking because the adoption of Islamic law in Indonesia 
is one of the few tangible policy trends evident in a political system defined by 
clientelist rather than programmatic politics.14 In addition, the discussion over the 
proper role of Islamic law in politics is one of the most enduring ideological fault 
lines in Indonesian politics. Dating back to the constitutional debates in 1945, the 
shari’a debate allows for a longitudinal comparison of the political influence of 
different groups before and after 1998. Moreover, the groups traditionally fighting 
over the adoption of Islamic law have always been rooted in a relatively clearly 
defined class of peasant entrepreneurs and traders of non-aristocratic origin situated 
outside the state.15 Local shari’a policymaking is therefore a good indicator for how 
changing relations within the state subsequently shape relations between the state 
and society. Finally, South Sulawesi provides an excellent vantage point from which 
to examine my two arguments because the number of shari’a regulations adopted 
there is relatively high compared to other provinces. 
 The chapter begins with my analysis of the major themes within the oligarchy 
thesis and in the literature that has sought to challenge it, arguing that—just as the 
explanatory power of the oligarchy thesis is limited by its inattention to the power 
resources of New Order figures in the political arena—voluntarist and collectivist 
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challenges to it lack the explanatory power of an approach that privileges the 
dynamics within the political elite. Turning to the case study, the chapter shows first 
how the power of political elites is determined by a concentration of non-economic 
power rather than of material wealth. It then provides evidence of the increasingly 
competitive nature of relations among state elites since 1998, and of how this 
heightened competition has subsequently allowed some societal groups that were 
politically impotent during the New Order to gain influence. The conclusion returns 
to the broader theme of changing state–society relations in post-New Order 
Indonesia. 
 
OLIGARCHY AND BEYOND 
 If we are to engage with the oligarchy thesis, it is important to isolate its key 
questions, concepts, and hypotheses. There are important differences between the 
work of Hadiz and Robison and that of Winters, which makes a structured critique 
of the “oligarchy thesis” challenging. However, there are elements where their 
approaches clearly overlap. First, they agree that economic conditions have long 
defined politics in Indonesia. Winters argues that the New Order regime provided a 
formidable tool for a small number of individuals to protect (and expand) their 
wealth and income.16 While defining the power base of these individuals in purely 
material terms, he acknowledges that strategies of wealth defense commonly include 
interventions in the political realm. In Hadiz and Robison’s version of the oligarchy 
thesis, the accumulation of wealth in Indonesia occurs primarily through “control of 
public institutions.”17 As a consequence, “politico–economic oligarchs” directly 
occupy bureaucratic and political posts from where they control access to the state as 
well as nodal points in state–business relations. 
 Second, Hadiz and Robison argue that this constellation of power survived the 
end of the regime because the demise of the New Order resembled a palace revolt 
rather than a social revolution. According to these authors, since class relations 
established during the New Order were not affected by the collapse of the 
dictatorship, it was possible for the small group of people who had accumulated 
financial and political power to reconstitute their power within democratic 
institutions after 1998.18 This also explains why the political forces of the preceding 
regime are able to define the way state authority and social power is transformed 
within the new institutions of democracy. Similarly, Winters argues that the end of 
the New Order regime marked a change from a sultanistic oligarchy to an untamed 
ruling oligarchy; in other words, a change only in how oligarchs relate to one 
another.  
 Third, new wealth and income defense strategies required in the post-1998 
context have shaped politics. According to Winters, the demise of Suharto has forced 
oligarchs, in the name of wealth defense, to become more directly involved in 
                                                           
16 Winters, Oligarchy, pp. 140–1. 
17 Hadiz and Robison, “The Political Economy of Oligarchy,” p. 37. Boudreau also argues that 
New Order interests control access to the political system. However, he talks about “elites” 
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Indonesia and the Philippines,” Pacific Review 22,2 (2009): 233–53.  
18 Hadiz and Robison, “The Political Economy of Oligarchy.” 
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politics. In a context where “being an oligarch is closely intertwined with 
governing,” they have thus morphed into “electoral ruling” oligarchs.19 In the 
electoral arena, their great wealth has allowed them to “play a central role in shaping 
who can contend for office.”20 As a consequence, “Indonesians get to choose among 
options that are strongly oligarchically determined.”21 Hadiz and Robison, 
meanwhile, argue that because the established fabric that had connected state 
authority, political power, and economic wealth remained largely intact, genuinely 
new parties are either absent or have been co-opted into the oligarchy.22 And since 
oligarchs dominate the political arena, there is no room for a “progressive civil 
society,” for Indonesian civil society is fragmented and lacks the mobilizational 
capacity to mount an effective challenge against oligarchic rule.23 Hence, 
organizations and interests situated outside the state are unable to impose their will 
on the state and its officials and oligarchs are free to pursue a political agenda that is 
incompatible with truly democratic politics.24  
 Fourth, these modes of accumulation and exercise of power define both national 
and subnational politics. Although “reformers” may initially have introduced “some 
change” in several provinces and districts, they, too, have fallen victim to the logics 
of predatory politics defined by “the same kinds of social interests previously at the 
heart of Suharto’s New Order,” according to Hadiz and Robison.25 In Hadiz’s view, 
“little kings” (raja kecil) rig the rules of the game and form collusive networks that 
prevent social forces from gaining access to the local political system.26 Winters does 
not explicitly mention subnational oligarchs, but his account of the Jakarta 
gubernatorial elections suggests that he agrees that oligarchs dominate both national 
and subnational politics.27 
 Fifth and finally, reflecting the classic Marxist argument that the democratization 
of economic relations ought to precede elections if the latter are to be meaningful,28 
Hadiz and Robison conclude that genuine democratization and political change will 
                                                           
19 Winters , “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia,” pp. 15ff.  
20 Ibid., p. 22. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Hadiz and Robison, “The Political Economy of Oligarchy,” p. 36. 
23 Ibid., p. 50. 
24 Hadiz and Robison backtrack from this view to some extent in their contribution to this 
volume (pp. 35–56). According to Winters’s more nuanced theory, the presence of a 
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democratization and electoral politics do not interfere with the wealth-defense strategies of 
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Winters, “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia.” 
25 Hadiz and Robison, “The Political Economy of Oligarchy,” p. 53. 
26 Hadiz, Localising Power, p. 43. Some scholars have even argued that democratization and 
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Nankyung Choi, Local Politics in Indonesia: Pathways to Power (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 
p. 102. 
27 Hadiz and Robison see oligarchs dominating subnational politics while Winters sees 
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“Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia,” pp. 22–25. 
28 Benedict Anderson, “Elections and Participation in Three Southeast Asian Countries,” in The 
Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. Robert H. Taylor (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 12. 
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occur if economic change determines “new forms of production and property [that] 
give rise to new forces and interests.”29 Similarly, Winters argues that oligarchy 
cannot be overcome through elections in the absence of a fairer distribution of 
wealth.30 To summarize, there is broad agreement that, since the events of May 1998 
did not democratize class relations, Indonesian politics may have changed in style 
but not in substance.31 
 There are many possible challenges to these premises. For instance, voluntarist 
approaches claim that state–society relations in Indonesia are changing. Individual 
“decision-makers” are the drivers of this change since classes “cannot overwhelm 
and deny the individual’s capacity for autonomous choice.”32 These approaches 
claim that Indonesians have voted for “attractive leadership”33 that is “both 
responsive and responsible” to citizens’ demands at the national level.34 At the 
subnational level, meanwhile, the decentralization of power facilitated the 
emergence of “reform-minded individuals.”35 While acknowledging that such 
leaders are rare, these scholars observe that provinces and districts that have been 
blessed with such “good leadership” have seen change ranging from the inclusion of 
hitherto marginalized groups in political deliberations36 to the reform of tax codes in 
favor of private sector interests.37  
 But those who see “enlightened leadership” as the main catalyst for changing 
state–society relations struggle as much as do theorists of oligarchy when it comes to 
explaining power dynamics in post-1998 Indonesia. Key concepts such as “good 
leadership” are, if at all, poorly conceptualized, and the mechanisms and processes 
through which individual leaders change Indonesian politics are neither described 
nor explained. Hence, we learn neither how “reform-minded leaders” manage to 
bypass bureaucratic resistance and opposition within the state apparatus nor why 
only certain figures are able to act in new ways. Furthermore, the number of reform-
minded individuals represented in formal politics is far too small to explain the fact 
that state–society relations have changed across the archipelago. 
 Meanwhile, scholars working within a pluralist theoretical framework have 
mounted two lines of attack against the oligarchy thesis. “Interest group pluralists” 
doubt that the oligarchs are as dominant in Indonesian politics as Hadiz and Robison 
                                                           
29 Hadiz and Robison, “The Political Economy of Oligarchy,” p. 41. 
30 Winters, “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia,” p. 12. 
31 Similar arguments are made by John Sidel, “The Changing Politics of Religious Knowledge 
in Asia: The Case of Indonesia,” in The Politics of Knowledge, ed. Saw Swee-Hock and Danny 
Quah (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), pp. 156–92; and Yuki Fukuoka, “Oligarchy and Democracy in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia,” Political Studies Review 11,1 (2013): 52–64. 
32 R. Willam Liddle, “The Politics of Development Policy,” World Development 20,6 (1992): 796.  
33 Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, “Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining Voting 
Behavior in Indonesia,” Comparative Political Studies 40,7 (2007): 844.  
34 Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, “Personalities, Parties, and Voters,” Journal of 
Democracy 21,2 (2010): 49.  
35 Arianto Patunru, Neil McCulloch, and Christian von Luebke, “A Tale of Two Cities: The 
Political Economy of Local Investment Climate in Solo and Manado, Indonesia,” IDS Working 
Papers 228 (2009): 1–43.  
36 Sebastian Eckardt, Accountability and Decentralized Service Delivery: Explaining Performance 
Variation across Local Governments in Indonesia (Berlin: Nomos Verlag, 2009). 
37 Christian von Luebke, “The Political Economy of Local Governance: Findings from an 
Indonesian Field Study,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 45,2 (2009): 201–30. 
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and Winters claim. They argue that after 1998, representatives from a variety of 
interest groups, including entrepreneurs, politically ambitious newcomers, and civil 
society representatives, entered politics. There, they effectively counterbalance 
oligarchic dominance.38 There are, however, several problems with this argument. 
Interest group pluralism somewhat naïvely assumes that the presence of interest 
groups in politics equates to political influence. In addition, there is only scant 
evidence that a broad range of societal interests is represented in formal Indonesian 
politics. Even if one believes that a broad range of interest groups have come to 
inhabit the legislative branch of government after 1998, many crucial decisions in 
Indonesian politics are not presented for legislative debate because the executive 
branch of government drives the policymaking process.39 The powers assigned to the 
president, governors, and district heads since 1998 means that those who want to 
retain political prominence need to connect themselves to the executive branch of 
government. However, rather than being home to a “very heterogeneous class” of 
political actors,40 the top posts of the executive branch are dominated by a single 
social type: a male bureaucrat who started his career during the New Order.41  
 Aware of these problems, “critical pluralists” have mounted a second line of 
attack against the oligarchy thesis, which no longer focuses on the “social 
foundations” of political conflict but on “policy outcomes.”42 The explanatory power 
of the “oligarchy thesis” is weak, according to this argument, because it is unable to 
account for the kind of policy outcomes that have been evident in both national and 
local politics after 1998. Examples of policies that have undergone change include 
those associated with women’s affairs, labor issues,43 and human rights, as well as 
predatory taxes and levies. While there is no space here for an in-depth analysis of 
concrete policies in these (and other) areas, it is clear that many of them could be 
interpreted as a sign of continuing oligarchic dominance.44 Even if one agrees that 
many policy outcomes in contemporary Indonesia cannot be explained within an 
                                                           
38 Marcus Mietzner, “Fighting the Hellhounds: Pro-democracy Activists and Party Politics in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 43,1 (2013): 28–50. 
39 Anis Ibrahim, S. H. Sirajuddin, Nuruddin Hady, dan Umar Sholahuddin, Parlemen Lokal 
DPRD: Peran dan Fungsi dalam Dinamika Otonomi Daerah, (Malang: Setara Press, 2008), p. 27. 
40 Marcus Mietzner, “Oligarchs, Politicians, and Activists: Contesting Party Politics in Post-
Suharto Indonesia,” this volume, pp. 99–116. 
41 Michael Buehler, “Married with Children: The Second Round of Direct Elections for 
Governors and District Heads Shows that Democratisation is Allowing Powerful Families to 
Entrench Themselves in Local Politics,” Inside Indonesia 112 (April–June 2013).  
42 Thomas Pepinsky, “Pluralism and Political Conflict in Indonesia,” this volume, p. 88. 
43 Teri L. Caraway and Michele Ford, “Labor and Politics under Oligarchy,” this volume, pp. 
139–55. 
44 For instance, one may argue that the higher number of women in parliament in 2009 
compared to 2004 has not resulted from the struggle of women’s organizations for gender 
parity through the introduction of a quota system, but was due to a shift from a closed- to an 
open-party list system in 2008. The open-party list system created disincentives for candidates 
to run under a party label and therefore placed a premium on “face recognition.” Hence, many 
of the new female legislators are softcore-porn starlets, soap opera actresses, and singers. In 
addition, many female parliamentarians belong to families that managed to entrench 
themselves in politics after 1998. See Michael Buehler, “Married with Children.” The higher 
number of female representatives in the 2009 parliament compared to previous parliaments 
could therefore be interpreted as indicative of the growing power of oligarchic interests in 
Indonesian politics.  
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oligarchic framework, the explanatory power of a critical pluralism is hardly any 
stronger. Stripping pluralist theory of its core idea that governments are responding 
to the concerns of organized interest groups from all levels of society, critical 
pluralism shifts its focus to the very top of the political pecking order. The language 
used to describe the players shaping policymaking at both the national and local 
level in post-1998 Indonesia is revealing. “Allies of the regime” and “Indonesia’s 
most extremely wealthy … citizens”45 fight it out against one another. 
 Against this backdrop, critical pluralism looks in many ways more like an elite 
competition model of the kind I suggested earlier. However, it lacks important 
components, which an elite competition model incorporates. For instance, its focus 
on policy outcomes neglects a thorough analysis of power constellations at the 
beginning of the policymaking process. This not only poses the danger of producing 
ex post facto explanations of policies,46 but, more important, it risks ignoring 
important players altogether. For instance, Thomas Pepinsky’s take on pluralism 
leaves the state entirely untheorized, and fails to deal with such important issues as 
the background of figures inhabiting the government, dynamics between them, and 
the sequence in which change unfolds. 
 Finally, proponents of state-in-society approaches argue that change in Indonesia 
is unfolding from the bottom up through collective action and “popular agency.”47 
These scholars see the state as a relatively limited actor that competes with groups in 
society for influence and political hegemony.48 They argue that societal groups have 
reclaimed authority at the “street level”49 by holding demonstrations and protests.50 
Like interest group pluralists, many of these scholars also claim that the demise of 
the New Order has allowed “new men” to occupy state office.51 Yet, in fact, civil 
society is fragmented,52 and many nongovernmental organizations remain poorly 
organized.53 Moreover, many of these early studies did not specify the mechanisms 
through which this weak and fragmented civil society imposes its agenda onto the 
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46 See, for instance, Ryan Tans, “Mobilizing Resources, Building Coalitions: Local Power in 
Indonesia,” Policy Studies 64 (Honolulu, HI: East–West Center, 2012), pp. 1–17. 
47 Danielle N. Lussier and M. Steven Fish, “Indonesia: The Benefits of Civic Engagement,” 
Journal of Democracy 23,1 (2012): 70–84; Gerry van Klinken, “The Maluku Wars: Bringing 
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50 Caraway and Ford, “Labor and Politics under Oligarchy.” 
51 Syarif Hidayat and Gerry van Klinken, “Provincial Business and Politics,” in State of 
Authority: The State in Society in Indonesia, ed. van Klinken and Barker, pp. 149–62; Jacqueline 
Vel, “Pilkada in East Sumba: An Old Rivalry in a New Democratic Setting,” Indonesia 80 
(October 2009): 80–107. 
52 Aspinall, “A Nation in Fragments,” pp. 27–54. 
53 Hans Antloev, Derick W. Brinkerhoff, and Elke Rapp, “Civil Society Capacity Building for 
Democratic Reform: Experience and Lessons from Indonesia,” Voluntas 21,3 (2010): 417–39. 
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state to effect change from below.54 Finally, “civil society” is not broadly represented 
in Indonesian formal politics, a fact some state-in-society scholars readily admit.55  
 Addressing such flaws in earlier research, more recent studies have argued that 
subaltern groups, despite their fragmentation and their lack of representation in 
formal politics, have nevertheless changed politics from below. For instance, Edward 
Aspinall argues that a fragmented civil society has become influential in politics 
because “[p]olitical pressure exerted … through mobilization …” shaped 
policymaking in the context of “the rise of competitive elections.”56 These dynamics 
result in policy outcomes the oligarchy theory cannot explain.57  
 Such an interpretation of change in Indonesian politics is problematic for several 
reasons. Most important, the influence of groups from below is contingent on elite 
conflict. In other words, the “networks and clusters of actors that connect [the] ruling 
elite with activist groups and coalitions, providing … conduits for policy influence 
from below”58 have emerged and gained importance as a consequence of heightened 
competition among state elites. Only an elite competition model that locates the 
trigger for social change at the apex of the political structure can explain, for 
instance, why organized labor “has not seen a radical expansion of … political power 
[after 1998]”59 but has nevertheless gained some influence over policymaking. If elite 
competition were absent, labor would have been unlikely to have gained more 
influence. 
 An elite competition model not only better explains the sequence in which 
change unfolds and why societal actors have gained influence without 
commensurate improvements in capacity compared to the New Order, but also 
illuminates the specificities of policymaking in contemporary Indonesia. For 
instance, the elite competition model reveals that Indonesia’s many local healthcare 
schemes are driven by incumbents rather than class mobilization, as collectivist 
approaches have acknowledged.60 An elite competition model can also explain better 
than collectivist approaches why the influence of most societal groups is confined to 
the agenda-setting stage of the policy cycle.61 
 To summarize, an approach that sees changing relations among state elites as 
explaining changes in state–society relations thus both challenges the oligarchy thesis 
and better explains why and in what order change has occurred than either the 
voluntarist or collectivist approach do. In contrast to oligarchy theory, such an 
approach acknowledges that many players who influence policymaking do so based 
                                                           
54 Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Democratic Stagnation,” pp. 9–14; Lussier and Fish, “Indonesia,” pp. 
70–84. 
55 For example, Aspinall, “Popular Agency and Interests,” shows that sixteen years after the 
demise of the New Order, there is no “embedded institutional power for labor … ” (p. 128). 
56 Ibid., p. 119.  
57 Caraway and Ford, “Labor and Politics under Oligarchy,” make a similar argument. 
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59 Ibid., p. 129. 
60 Ibid., p. 130. 
61 Aspinall, “Popular Agency and Interests,” and Caraway and Ford, “Labor and Politics 
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delivered, while policies are often adopted but patchily implemented. Overall, societal groups 
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what we would expect according to the elite competition model as outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter.  
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on their political rather than economic power. Change in state–society relations has 
therefore been possible without change in broader economic structures. An elite 
competition model also addresses the failure of voluntarist accounts to acknowledge 
that it is not “new men” but, in fact, “old elites” socialized and politicized during the 
authoritarian New Order who for the first time in their careers are conducting 
surveys to sound out their popularity, employing new campaign tactics, and 
spending months on dusty roads campaigning in remote villages. Likewise, the 
acknowledgement that change began at the top and radiated downward explains 
better than collectivist approaches the timing and extent of influence from below. 
Political change is contingent on elite conflict since societal groups became more 
influential after competition among state elites had increased. Furthermore, an elite 
competition model explains why some groups but not others have managed to take 
advantage of elite competition, thereby revealing the limits of “pressure from 
below.” Since state elites continue to dominate formal politics, they mediate the 
influence of societal groups. Groups gain influence only if they provide state elites 
with resources the latter deem useful for accumulating and maintaining power. 
Those that do not provide such resources may mobilize but are unlikely to gain 
political influence.  
 
SHARI’A POLICYMAKING IN SOUTH SULAWESI 
 The case study of subnational shari’a policymaking illustrates the distinctiveness 
of an approach that centers on dynamics among state elites and how these dynamics 
subsequently affect state–society relations. Moreover, by stepping outside of the 
Jakarta-centric study of Indonesia that has so preoccupied the analysis of oligarchy, 
this approach reveals where most important changes in post-Suharto Indonesian 
politics are occurring. 
 A close-knit aristocracy has long dominated politics in South Sulawesi province. 
While mythical conceptions of the hierarchical order of society, control over 
syncretist forms of Islam, and intermarriage among the noble families of South 
Sulawesi strengthened the position of the aristocracy vis-à-vis commoners, it was 
mainly economic conditions that determined the political power of the aristocracy 
over ordinary people. For centuries, the main source of aristocratic political power 
was an appanage system of landownership that became increasingly exploitative 
after the Kingdom of Bone, a land-based court without much stake in sea-trade 
activities, rose to power in 1667.62 The aristocracy’s economic dominance came under 
pressure after the Dutch colonial government took control of “a large part of the 
‘regalia lands’ (tanah arajang) and ‘privileged lands’ (tanah ongko).”63 The income the 
nobility obtained from their landholdings was successively reduced in the following 
decades so that, by the 1920s, accountability reports submitted by outgoing Dutch 
officials to the colonial government, the memories van overgave, stressed that the local 
aristocracy had only a few large landholdings left and that only a few peasants in 
South Sulawesi were actually landless.64 
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63 Pelras, “Patron–Client Ties,” p. 38. 
64 Ibid., p. 36. 
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 The economic decline of the local aristocracy worked to the advantage of a 
commercial class of rich peasants and rice traders of non-aristocratic background. 
Over time, many of these commoners replaced the nobles as agricultural patrons 
(punggawa allaonrumang), and from this situation, they branched out into other 
sectors of the economy.65 Many of these new-wealth elites organized under the 
banner of religious organizations such as the modernist Muhammadiyah. Opening 
its first branch in the provincial capital Makassar in 1926, Muhammadiyah’s decisive 
anti-aristocratic tone and its message of upward social mobility based on merit and 
personal achievements made the organization an ideal vehicle for these rice traders 
and landowners to seek more influence in the rigidly structured society of South 
Sulawesi.  
 The cleavage between the ruling aristocracy, members of which practiced mixed 
forms of Islam, and non-aristocratic landowners and rice traders attracted to more 
purist strains of Islam became even more pronounced after the outbreak of a 
rebellion. Guerrilla units that had fought for Indonesia’s independence in South 
Sulawesi demanded their incorporation into the army after 1949. After the national 
government refused to accommodate these guerrilla groups, their leaders revolted. 
Initially, the rebellion in South Sulawesi attracted many aristocrats who had fought 
for independence and now wanted to be rewarded with positions in the Indonesian 
army and bureaucracy. However, the rebel movement split in 1953 after leader 
Kahar Muzakkar pledged allegiance to the Darul Islam rebellion, which had been 
fighting for a state based on Islamic law in West Java since 1948. After 1953, the 
national government provided most aristocrats with local government positions, 
thereby effectively terminating their resistance to the republic. 
 The Darul Islam rebellion under the Muzakkar leadership, however, continued 
for another decade, weakening the economic position of the aristocracy further. Most 
noblemen fled to the cities of South Sulawesi, which isolated them from their 
landholdings and trading points. Without access to these assets, they were forced to 
sustain the followers that had come with them to the cities from funds they had 
accumulated before the rebellion. After the Indonesian army had killed Muzakkar in 
1965, the aristocrats realized that “[t]he establishment of security was … of no 
assistance to them, since the traditional forms of government, as well as the incomes 
attached to them, had been abolished in the meantime.”66 Their economic situation 
worsened further when the national government distributed land to poor peasants 
across the province under the Land Reform Act, which had been adopted nationwide 
in 1960 but was implemented in the province only after 1965 due to the rebellion. By 
the 1970s, 60 percent of the peasants in South Sulawesi owned the land on which 
they worked, while 40 percent were share tenants, approximately only a quarter of 
whom cultivated land owned by the local nobility.67  
 Although reliable data on landownership patterns in post-1998 South Sulawesi 
are not available, it is clear that the majority of people continue to work as relatively 
independent subsistence farmers.68 Yet, despite material resources becoming more 
evenly spread across the population in the province, the local aristocracy was able to 
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66 Ibid., p. 38.  
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retain its political dominance under Suharto’s regime because the end of the Darul 
Islam rebellion in 1965 coincided with the rise of the New Order. Suharto continued 
to reward the aristocrats who had abandoned Muzakkar with positions in the local 
army and the bureaucracy.69 Hence, aristocrats occupied most of the governor and 
district head posts in South Sulawesi throughout the New Order period.70 Since the 
national government appointed subnational government heads, local aristocrats 
understood that tight connections to Jakarta were necessary to maintain power. 
Having links to the local population was simply not important in the advancement 
of one’s career. 
  
 Increased Elite Competition after 1998 
 
 As a consequence of the hierarchical nature of the New Order regime, open 
competition among state elites in South Sulawesi was minimal between 1965 and 
1998. This changed after the fall of Suharto, when new rules were adopted that 
introduced elections for governors and district heads via local parliaments until 2005, 
and through direct elections since. Despite these institutional changes, state elites 
continue to dominate South Sulawesi politics. At least 45 percent of candidates 
competing in local elections in South Sulawesi, and at least 42 percent of the winners, 
are New Order academics, bureaucrats, and military personnel who had joined the 
state apparatus during the Suharto years (see Table 1).71 
 At first glance, this data seem to confirm Hadiz’ reading of the continuing 
political dominance of New Order “interests” in local politics.72 There were very few 
representatives of mass organizations or other society based groups participating in 
these local elections, and even fewer newcomers succeeded in entering the formal 
political system as a member of a local legislature or a district head. Where the 
oligarchy thesis breaks down is in its reading of the power resources of these elites, 
as shown above, and how dynamics among these elites shape state–society relations. 
Both the indirect elections between 1998 and 2005 and the direct elections since 2005 
triggered fierce competition among state elites. In South Sulawesi, there were two 
indirect and two direct gubernatorial elections as well as thirty-two indirect and 
forty-seven direct district head elections between 1998 and 2013. Almost all these 
elections were fiercely contested. In most elections, there were at least two viable 
candidates with a good chance of winning and relatively equal strength with regard 
to the number of votes they obtained (see Table 2).73 
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Table 1: Background of District Head and Deputy District Head 
 Candidates, 1998-2013 
 
South Sulawesi  
  
  
  Governor 
Deputy 
Governor 
District 
Head 
Deputy 
District 
Head Mayor 
Deputy 
Mayor Total 
Winner 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Academic 
Loser 0 0 2 9 2 4 17 
Winner 2 0 27 21 3 2 55 
Bureaucrat 
Loser 0 2 76 66 11 5 160 
Winner 0 0 3 0 0 1 4 Military/ 
Police Loser 1 0 8 5 1 0 15 
Winner 0 2 1 5 0 0 8 
Politician 
Loser 1 1 8 17 3 5 35 
Winner 0 0 7 4 0 0 11 Politician/ 
Private 
Sector Loser 0 0 5 3 1 1 10 
Winner 0 0 6 2 6 2 16 Private 
Sector Loser 2 1 21 23 9 9 65 
Winner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 
Loser 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Winner 0 0 17 25 2 6 50 
Missing 
Loser 0 0 47 44 13 14 118 
Total  6 6 228 227 51 49 567 
 
 This newly competitive environment has shifted the focus of state elites 
downward and outward in the political arena: instead of lobbying superiors and 
pulling strings in Jakarta, state elites are now dependent on the support of ordinary 
people. South Sulawesi’s population may be poor, but because many residents own 
the land on which they live, they are relatively independent compared to “locked-in” 
electorates in other parts of Southeast Asia, such as voters in parts of the Philippines 
under the control of land-based oligarchs.74 Since it is impossible to lobby every 
citizen individually, candidates running for local elections have had to find ways to 
mobilize and structure the electorate. There are many challenges that candidates 
must overcome to achieve these two goals, especially because many avenues 
available to politicians in consolidated democracies do not exist in Indonesia. Most 
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important, Indonesian political parties are weakly institutionalized and lack stable 
constituencies. Parties also have no comprehensive and well-formulated party 
platforms, and no money to appeal to voters. As a consequence, Indonesian 
politicians need to establish personal political machines to mobilize and structure the 
masses.75 It is against this backdrop that linkages to local power brokers and their 
networks have acquired new importance. 
 
 Growing Interdependence between State Elites and Islamist Groups 
 
 The three gubernatorial campaigns in South Sulawesi after 1998 exemplify the 
increased competition among state elites, and the growing links between candidates 
and Islamist groups that have emerged as a consequence of that competition. In the 
first gubernatorial election in South Sulawesi in 2003, the provincial parliament 
elected Amin Syam as governor. Syam was born in Bone district in South Sulawesi in 
1945 and joined the military in 1960. He was initially stationed in West Java, but 
transferred to South Sulawesi a few years later to fight against the Darul Islam. Over 
the following decades, Syam rose through the ranks of the local military command 
and eventually became a major-general. He also occupied civilian posts like many 
military men during the New Order. He was the district head of Enrekang between 
1988 and 1993 and became the head of the South Sulawesi parliament as a member of 
the Golkar party (Partai Golongan Karya, Party of the Functional Groups) in the final 
years of the New Order.  
 Syam announced in 2005 that he would seek reelection in 2007. In anticipation of 
the first direct gubernatorial election to be held in South Sulawesi province, he started 
to establish campaign structures across South Sulawesi.76 Syam mobilized the 
bureaucracy, courted the Golkar party, and established a campaign team consisting 
of relatives and supporters. To increase his electability, he also approached various 
groups with extensive networks in South Sulawesi society. In this context, Syam 
began to visit religious boarding schools across South Sulawesi, and also to mingle 
with figures from Islamist networks in 2006.77 
A year before the gubernatorial elections, for instance, Syam visited the grave of 
Ahmad Marzuki Hasan, the founder of a radical pesantren called Darul Istiqamah. 
The visit was clearly a campaign event, as a large entourage of local politicians and 
journalists accompanied him on the visit.78 In July 2006, Syam visited the Islamist 
Darul Ulum Pesantren in Maros, where he praised the important contributions the 
school had made in the fight for the adoption of Islamic law in South Sulawesi. Syam 
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also made a significant cash donation to the school.79 Only a few weeks later, Syam, 
as governor, adopted shari’a regulation No. 4/2006 to improve Quran reading skills 
across the province.  
Syam’s interest in these networks marked a clear change in political strategy. In 
2001, as the head of the provincial parliament (and facing no immediate elections), 
Syam had refused to embrace the agenda of Islamist groups. At that time, he told the 
local press that as a private citizen he was sympathetic to the cause of Islamist 
groups, but as the head of the provincial parliament, he was against adopting 
shari’a.80 On the eve of Election Day in 2007, he told me: “Yes, if people reelect me, I 
will continue to adopt shari’a regulations in South Sulawesi province.”81  
 Despite Syam’s efforts to embrace local policy demands, it was his deputy, 
Syahrul Yasin Limpo, who eventually won the first direct gubernatorial election. 
Limpo’s background and political trajectory show interesting parallels to Syam’s. 
Limpo belongs to a military family that rose to power during the New Order. He 
entered the bureaucracy in Gowa district in 1980 and steadily rose through the ranks 
of the New Order civilian apparatus until he was appointed district head in Gowa in 
1994. A member of the Golkar party since the early 1980s, and with good connections 
to the local parliamentarians, Limpo was elected by the local legislature for a second 
term in 1999. Although known for his involvement in various drug and sex 
scandals,82 rather than for his piety, Limpo adopted his first shari’a regulation as 
Gowa district head in 2001. Soon after he became governor in 2007, Limpo 
announced his plans to run for reelection in 2013. In the following years, Limpo 
frequently socialized with Islamist groups across the province. In 2011, he adopted a 
shari’a regulation that prohibited the activities of Ahmadiyah, a heterodox Islamic 
group, in South Sulawesi province.  
 Limpo’s main competitor in the 2013 gubernatorial race was the mayor of 
Makassar, Ilham Arief Sirajuddin. Son of Arief Sirajuddin, a New Order police 
lieutenant-colonel who had been district head in Gowa between 1976 and 1984, 
Ilham Arief Sirajuddin used his father’s affiliation with the New Order state to 
establish various businesses, which he then managed between 1992 and 2004. The 
younger Sirajuddin also led various associations linked to the New Order, including 
the Communication Forum for the Daughters and Sons of Retired Military and Police 
Officers, the Association of Young Indonesian Businessmen, and South Sulawesi’s 
Chamber of Commerce. A Golkar member since 1992, he had occupied a seat in the 
1999–2004 provincial parliament for Golkar. In 2004, the parliament elected him as 
mayor of Makassar. In his campaign to become governor, Sirajuddin, too, 
approached Islamist networks. For the 2013 election campaign, he chose Aziz Kahar 
Muzakkar, the son of the former Darul Islam leader, as his running mate. Sirajuddin 
also adopted various shari’a regulations as mayor of Makassar, including the 
collection of religious taxes and rules concerning dress codes for schoolgirls.  
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 This brief sketch of the gubernatorial elections in South Sulawesi province after 
1998 shows that they almost exclusively involved state elites, who competed against 
one another. It also shows that these figures, some of whom fought against Islamist 
groups before 1998, are now collaborating with Islamist networks because they 
believe that Islamist networks can provide mobilizational, financial, and coercive 
resources important to entice voters. Candidates have tried to gain access to pesantren 
networks, prayer groups, and Qur’an recitation circles in which hundreds of 
thousands of people meet daily across South Sulawesi. Islamist groups are 
gatekeepers to some of the largest of these networks. In addition, many boarding 
schools have mobilized their students to support the candidate endorsed by the 
school owner. Often, shari’a regulations have also served as a means to accumulate 
capital. Many shari’a regulations on religious alms have been adopted, allowing local 
government heads to collect considerable amounts of money they have later used for 
political ends. Finally, Islamist groups have provided candidates with coercive 
power. Local Islamist paramilitaries, many consisting of local thugs and petty 
criminals, frequently serve as election witnesses, intimidate voters, and act as 
“enforcers” for local government heads.83 
 The provincial patterns sketched here are mirrored at the district level. There, 
state elites with similar backgrounds to the candidates described above have sought 
to develop links to Islamist groups as a way of gaining an advantage in their 
competition against one another. The outcome of this growing interconnectedness 
parallels that at the provincial level. During the New Order, not a single shari’a 
regulation was in force in the province. Between 1998 and 2013, almost all districts in 
South Sulawesi adopted at least one shari’a regulation, amounting to forty-four such 
regulations in total. There have been similar developments in a number of other 
provinces in Indonesia. Since 1998, local state elites have adopted at least 420 shari’a 
regulations.84 These shari’a regulations cluster in former Darul Islam areas. There, 
Islamist pressure groups similar to those found in South Sulawesi have gained 
influence over the policymaking process as a consequence of heightened competition 
among state elites.85  
 I argued earlier that state elites mediate the influence of societal groups. In other 
words, state elites have only become more receptive to pressures from societal 
groups in places and situations where such players can provide them with resources 
they deem important to gain and maintain power. Groups that cannot offer such 
information and resources remain unable to influence local politics through state 
elites. This point can be demonstrated by comparing the Islamist movements 
described here with the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the 
country’s strongest and most successful Islamist party. In the late New Order, a 
dakwah movement emerged among the pious urban middle class. Members of this 
movement used the political opening in 1998 to mobilize and establish PKS, much 
like the local Islamist groups mentioned above that also established organizations 
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after the fall of Suharto. However, due to PKS’s roots in urban areas, its networks are 
of no use to state elites in need of clientelistic networks that are—in Indonesia as in 
most other Asian countries—largely a rural phenomenon.86 Consequently, local state 
elites have not reached out to PKS. And since PKS cannot provide state elites with 
resources the latter deem necessary to win elections, the party’s influence over shari’a 
policymaking remains negligible. Immediately after 1998, PKS, too, pushed for the 
adoption of Islamic law at both the national and local level. Realizing its political 
impotence, however, the party leadership decided to abandon its shari’a platform 
and to adjust to the political mainstream.87 This pattern reinforces the conclusion that 
increased visibility and assertiveness of interest groups should not automatically be 
taken as a sign of their growing influence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 New Order elites continue to dominate the state, and representatives of hitherto 
excluded groups are rarely running in and almost never winning South Sulawesi 
elections (or elections in any other province). However, local politics in Indonesia is 
not produced by “oligarchs.” It is produced by state elites who have adapted to the 
changing nature of post-New Order Indonesian politics by selectively reaching out to 
societal groups that can provide them with the resources they need to win elections.  
 In provinces with strong Islamist networks, the rapprochement between “the 
state” and “society” finds its expression in the adoption of shari’a regulations. The 
politics of shari’a policymaking shows that, rather than the structure of economic 
relations defining the possibilities for change in contemporary Indonesian politics, 
such opportunities are found in the interstices created by changing relations among 
state elites. For both Hadiz and Robison and for Winters, the fact that candidates 
endowed with bureaucratic power are winning most Indonesian elections is 
indicative of how the state continues to serve the interests of that class. However, 
most candidates losing elections are bureaucrats, too. This fact implies a sociology of 
the state that goes beyond an image of “the state” as the champion of unified class 
interests. The Indonesian state is not merely a condensation of existing class 
relations, and the nature of the state cannot be uncovered by analyzing the interests 
of some “dominant class” as a whole vis-à-vis society. The key explanatory variable 
behind changing state–society relations in Indonesia after 1998 is a political, not 
economic, one: the relationship among state elites. 
 The finding that political dynamics are now different, since the collapse of the 
New Order, even though economic structures have not changed significantly, is not 
immediately incompatible with Winters’s observation that oligarchs define politics 
only in areas from where potential threats to their wealth and income may arise.88 
The adoption of Islamic law, one could argue, is simply not of any interest to 
oligarchs. At the same time, however, the struggle over Islamic law in South 
Sulawesi (as in other parts of Indonesia) was always a proxy for a more deep-
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reaching conflict over control of resources between state elites and economic elites 
situated in society. The adoption of shari’a regulations thus reflects the strengthening 
of groups with the potential to threaten the wealth and income of current state elites. 
It is not a peripheral interest to those elites who control state power.  
 The elite competition model suggested in this chapter also better explains the 
contours of state–society relations in post-1998 Indonesian than do voluntarist and 
collectivist approaches. A focus on changing relations among “old” elites inhabiting 
the state explains why state–society relations are changing across the archipelago 
despite the lack of comprehensive elite turnover after the demise of Suharto. Rather 
than the presence of “reform champions,” it is the competition among “old” elites 
that has pushed the interaction between the state and society in new directions. At 
the same time, the elite competition model shows that change in state–society 
relations occurs in a top-down rather than bottom-up manner. Societal groups have 
become more influential in politics only after competition between elites increased. A 
view of Indonesian politics that centers on the relations among state elites not only 
reveals the opportunities for change in state–society relations, but also its limits. State 
elites are primarily motivated to adopt policies to attract the support of groups they 
need to gain and maintain power in Indonesia’s electoral democracy. Whether these 
policies are actually implemented is of secondary importance. Hence, groups 
situated in society seem to have, at best, won influence over agenda-setting and 
policy adoption, but lack influence over the implementation stage of the policy cycle. 
So long as these groups have no representatives in the formal political arena, this 
situation is unlikely to change, and this fact has important consequences for the 
quality of democracy in Indonesia.89 Moreover, due to the causal primacy of elite 
relations, and the dependency of these elites on the state, institutional change may 
quickly close the interstices through which some societal groups have managed to 
gain and exert political influence.90 In other words, the “deep architecture” of post-
1998 Indonesian politics may, in fact, not be all that deep after all. 
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